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IN THE

SUPREME COURT
OF THE

STATE OF UTAH
STATE OF UTAH,
Plaintiff-Respondent,
vs.
RODNEY C. ROSE,
Defendant-Appellant.

Case No.

12974

BRIEF OF RESPONDENT
STATEMENT OF THE NATURE OF THE CASE
Appellant appeals his conviction of Sale of a Stimulant Drug on the ground that the information charging
him with the crime specified "methamphetamine" rather
than "amphetamine".

DISPOSITION IN THE LOWER COURT
The complaint that charged appellant was amended
to read "amphetamine" rather than "methamphetamine".
Appellant's main defense was to establish an alibi, questionable identification procedures and possible mistakes
in preserving and handling the drugs in question. The
court sitting without a jury found appellant guilty.

2

RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL
Respondent prays that the decision of the low
er mur
be affirmed.
·

STATEMENT OF FACTS
On May 7, 1971, a complaint was issued againsta
pellant which charged that on April 19, 1971, he "did:
lawfully sell a stimulant drug, to wit: Methamphe~
mine" (Tr. 1). At the preliminary hearing on Ocm~·
8, 1971, the State moved the court to amend the com
plaint to read "amphetamine" in lieu of "methampheta.
mine". Defendant's objection to this motion was ove1
ruled and the complaint was amended (Tr. 11-12). TIE
complaint was amended by ·manually crossing off th,
first four letters of the word "methamphetamine" (T1.
1) . \Vhen the information was prepared, for some reason
it did not reflect the amendment authorized at the pri·
liminary hearing. Thus, appellant was arraigned on !ht
charge of "Sale of a Stimulant Drug committed as follow~.
to wit: That said defendant did unlawfully sell a stimu·
lant drug, to wit: Methamphetamine" (Tr. 14). Appel·
lant waived his right to a jury trial (Tr. 89).
During trial, the information was read and no objec·
tions were made by either side (Tr. 90). 'The State t.oxol·
ogist testified that the pills in question were amphe!A·
mine tablets. Upon cross examination, counsel for appel·
lant never asked the State toxologist about methamphe!A·
mine drugs but only questioned him concerning amphem
. mention~
mine drugs even though the State toxologISt
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that his tests could distinguish methamphetamine from
amphetamine (Tr. 136). Counsel for appellant attempt.eel
to establish that ( 1) the appellant was not accurately
identified, (2) there were possible mistakes in preserving
and handling the drugs, and (3) the appellant had an
alibi (Tr. 180-182). No attempt was made by appellant
to question the type of drug involved or to argue that it
didn't meet the crime as charged.

ARGUMENT
POINT I.
THE APPELLANT WAS PROPERLY
CHARGED AND CONVICTED OF SALE OF
A STIMULANT DRUG.
A valid and sufficient information may charge a defendant either by stating the name of an offense or by
stating enough of the definition of the offense as is sufficient to give the defendant and the court notice of the
offense intended to be charged. Utah Code Ann.
~ 77-21-8 (1953). The information that charged appellant
both named the offense and stat.eel a definition of the
offense. The name and definition of the offense are
found in Utah Code Ann. § 58-33-6 (1) ( 1971 Supp.),
which states, "It shall be unlawful for any person to ...
sell . . . any depressant, stimulant, or hallucinogenic, or
other drug . . . " The term "depressant, stimulant, or
hallucinogenic drug," among other definitions means:
"Any drug which contains any quantity of
(A) amphetamine: dl-methamphetamine; or any
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of_ th~ir optical isomers; ~B) any salt of am h
mme. dl-methamphetamme· or any salt f P em
. al .
f
'
0 an O[
t I~
isomer o amphetamine: dl-metham h ·
r:ime; or (C) any substance designated by!~
tions promulgated under the federal act as hab
11
forming because of its stimulant affect [effect!
the central nervous system." Utah Code~
§ 58-33-1 ( 1971 Supp.) .
The information which charged appellant states th,
name of the offense as the Sale of a Stimulant Drug ail
defines the offense by stating that "said defendant iliu
unlawfully sell a stimulant drug to wit: Methamphefu.
mine" (Tr. 14). Clearly there is enough information \ii
give the court and appellant notice of the offense charged
i.e., sale of a stimulant drug.
The basis of the error claimed by appellant is tbai
the information contained the word "methamphetarnine
instead of "amphetamine". There are four reasons wh1
this alleged error did not in any manner prejudice appel·
lant's trial. First, the naming of a particular drug is sur·
plusage. In the case of People v. Gelardi, 175 P. 2d ~i
(Cal. App. 1946), the defendant was convicted undern
information charging him with selling "a narcotic, 1:-0 wit:
Opiates," rather than selling a n2.rcotic, to wit, morphine.
The court held that the specification of opiates add~
nothing whatever to the information, and that it may~
treated as mere surplusage. The court continued: "How·
ever, without any specification of either opiates or mor·
phine, the accusation is sufficient, for it follows the Ian·
guage of the statute ... " Id. at 857. In the present~.
the information charging appellant follows the language
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of the statute. See Utah Code Ann. § 58-33-6(1) (1971
Supp.) supra. Since the language of the statute is followed by charging appellant with the sale of a stimulant
drug, the naming of a drug is surplusage and not required
to be included in an information. Utah Code Ann.
§ 'i'i-21-42 (1953).
In the similar case of State v. Madsen, 28 Utah 2d
108, 498 P. 2d 670 (1972), this Court found no error in
the fact that the drug identified at trial was different
than the drug named in the charge since the sale of the
drug idrntified at trial was a prohibited act. In the present case, it is unquestionable that the sale of amphetamine is a prohibited act and that the drug identified at
trial was amphetamine.
Second, the appellant could have found out any information about his charge if he were actually in need
of additional information by demanding a bill of particulars. Utah Code Ann. § 77-21-9 (1953).
Third, appellant cannot wait until he is convicted to
challenge the sufficiency of the information. In the case
of State v. Courtney, 10 Utah 2d 200, 350 P. 2d 619
(1960), the defendant made no attempt prior to his conviction to challenge the information and then alleged that
it did not meet the statutory requirements. This court
held that the information did comply with the Constitution and statutes of the State because the charge used
the name given the offense by statute. In continuing,
this court said:
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."Furthermore, his failure to demand a bill 1
particula:s, precludes ~he defendant on this a 01
to q~est10n, .for the frrst time the sufficien~~
the mformat1on." Id. at 621.
l '·
.
In t~e present case, appellant neither challenged \ht
information nor demanded a bill of particulars 80 ht
should be precluded from challenging the infonnation on
appeal.
Finally, the use of "methamphetamine" was m°'t
likely a clerical mistake which was not caught by either
party. During the preliminary hearing, it was recognizro
that the drug in question was amphetamine. The com.
plaint was allowed to be changed by crossing off the fust
four letters of "methamphetamine" with a pen (Tr. 1,
11-12) . The hand correction is ambiguous and could ~
the reason for the correction not appearing on the infor.
mation. Utah law provides that no information that con·
forms with § 22-21-8 shall be invalid because of any "mis·
writing". Further, no appeal based on any such imper
fection shall be sustained unless it is affirmatively shown
that the defendant was prejudiced in his defense. Uhl
Code Ann.§ 77-21-43 (1953).
Certainly, there was no prejudice to appellant's de·
fense when ( 1) no objection was made concerning the
information as read, (2) counsel for appellant used the
word "amphetamine" when cross examining the Stati
toxologist, and (3) no attempt was made by appellantro
question the type of drug involved or to argue that the
drug in question did not meet the crime as charged. An
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appellant cannot expect a new trial when he has been
charged with stealing a cake, to wit: chocolate; and his
only claim on appeal is that the cake was angel food.

CONCLUSION
Appellant's trial can best be characterized as a situation wherein both sides were talking about amphetamines,
where appellant was convicted of selling an amphetamine
but that due to a mistake, the information said "methamphetamine" which resulted in no prejudice to appellant. The conviction of the lower court must be upheld
because appellant was properly charged and convicted of
the crirne of selling a stimulant drug.
Respectfully submitted,

VERNON B. ROMNEY
Attorney General
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Chief Assistant Atoorney General
WILLIAM T. EVANS
Assistant Atoorney General
Attorneys for
Plaintiff-Respondent

